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In this paper I will claim that conceptual analysis can plausibly be held to play an essential role in 
“serious  metaphysics”  in  spite  of  skeptical  arguments  concerning  our  epistemic  access  to  A‐
intensions.  Before arguing for this  claim, I  will  present Frank Jackson’s conception of “serious 
metaphysics” and show why Jackson thinks that doing conceptual analysis is a necessary part of 
doing  “serious  metaphysics”.  Furthermore,  I  will  canvass  Jackson’s  distinction  between  A‐
intensions and C intensions, show the role this distinction plays in Jackson’s account of conceptual‐  
analysis  and  explain  why the  thesis  that  we have  a  priori  access  to  A intensions  is  crucial  to‐  
Jackson’s program. Once this has been covered, I will present an argument against our a priori 
access to A intensions and then show that this argument is too strong by providing two thought‐  
experiments. Next, I will suggest another argument against our a priori access to A intensions from‐  
the a posteriori nature of our theories. However, I will show that this argument need not pose a 
problem for Jackson provided that Jackson’s A intensions consist of the right kind of description. In‐  
this way, because Jackson can evade the skeptical arguments, Jackson can still claim that we have a 
priori  access  to  A intensions  and,  therefore,  that  conceptual  analysis  can  still  be  considered  a‐  
necessary condition of “serious metaphysics”.
Serious Metaphysics and the Location Problem
Metaphysics seeks to explain the world and what the world is like. Furthermore, metaphysics seeks 
a complete account of the world, such that everything in the world is explained in terms of a limited 
set  of  more  or  less  basic  notions.  Otherwise,  metaphysics  would  be involved in  no more  than 
drawing up big lists. For this reason, Jackson defines “serious metaphysics” as a metaphysics that 
explains the world and everything in the world in the terms of some limited vocabulary, where this 
vocabulary is  the most  relevant  vocabulary to  the metaphysical  theory that  describes  the  basic 
notions  of  the  metaphysics1.  Jackson  notes,  however,  that  if  we  are  committed  to  “serious 
metaphysics”, then we must also be committed to solving, what Jackson calls, the location problem.
In order  to understand what  Jackson means by the location problem, let  us assume that 
physicalism is true. Because physicalism is an instance of “serious metaphysics”, if physicalism is 
true, then the world and everything in the world can, in principle, be explained in the physical 
vocabulary,  i.e.  the vocabulary of  the  natural  sciences.  However,  the vocabulary of  the  natural 
sciences  does  not  explicitly  contain  statements  about  terms  like  “belief”,  “meaning”, 
“consciousness”, etc. Therefore, these kinds of terms are not explicitly a part of the physicalist’s 
theory.  In this way, statements about the terms not explicitly included in the vocabulary of the 
“serious metaphysics” will not be accounted for by the “serious metaphysics”. This is an instance of 
the location problem and can be generalized for any “serious metaphysics”. Call the set of all true 
statements in the limited vocabulary of a “serious metaphysics” the T statements and the set of all‐  
apparently true statements not explicitly contained within that vocabulary the D statements. If one‐  
1 For example,  in the case of physicalism, the limited vocabulary would be the vocabulary of biology,  chemistry, 
physics and neuroscience.  Furthermore,  it  is  important  to note that, while I  have defined “serious metaphysics” in 
linguistic terms, “serious metaphysics” can be equally well defined in ontological terms in the following way: a “serious 
metaphysics” is a metaphysics that explains the world and everything about the world in terms of a limited set of 
entities.
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is committed to doing “serious metaphysics”, then one must show that everything in the world can 
be explained by the  T statements. Therefore, because “serious metaphysics” leads to the location‐  
problem, a theorist of a “serious metaphysics” has two options: 1) be an eliminativist about the 
objects the D statements refer to or 2) show that the ‐ D statements are somehow included in the ‐ T‐
statements.2
Entry by Entailment and the Need for Conceptual Analysis
Jackson believes that we need to offer an account of how the D statements can be included in the ‐ T‐
statements. He does this by suggesting that while the D-statements may not explicitly be contained 
in  T statements,  they  may still  be  ‐ implicitly  contained  in  the  T statements.  Jackson,  therefore,‐  
distinguishes the explicit and implicit parts of a story. For example, I may explicitly  tell you that 
Glenn Branca is better than every other composer. However, in stating this I have implicitly told you 
that Glenna Branca is better than Mozart. This is because the explicit statement entails the implicit 
statement, affording the implicit statement a part in the story. In the same way, the T statements can‐  
implicitly contain D-statements because the T statements entail the ‐ D statements. Hence, Jackson’s‐  
solution to the location problem is to suggest that  D-statements are entailed by the  T statements.‐  
This is what Jackson calls entry by entailment. Furthermore, because entry by entailment claims 
that the T statements entail the  ‐ D-statements and that, because of this, the  T statements provide a‐  
complete account of the world, Jackson is also committed to the ontological thesis that the entities 
picked out by the T-statements supervene on the entities picked out by the D statements. In this way,‐  
a theorist  of a “serious metaphysics” can claim that there is nothing over an above the entities 
picked out by the T statements. Hence, Jackson suggests commitment to the following inter world‐ ‐  
global supervenience thesis:
B) Any world that is a minimal3 T statement satisfying‐ 4 duplicate of the actual world is a  
    duplicate simpliciter.
Therefore, B) is true if and only if at any world in which the T statements are true, the ‐ D statements‐  
are true as well. In this way, commitment to B) will prevent independent variation between the T‐
statements  and the  D statements  relevant  to  each  ‐ T statement  satisfying  duplicate  of  the actual‐  
world. Again, this is because the T statements entail the ‐ D statements. In this way, Jackson solves‐  
the Location Problem by suggesting that the D-statements can find a place in the story of a “serious 
metaphysics” by being entailed by that story5.
However, if this is to be convincing, then Jackson must have some story to tell about how the 
T–statements entail the  D statements, for, as it stands now, there is an explanatory gap between‐  
showing that because the  T statements are true, the  ‐ D statements are true as well.  According to‐  
Jackson, in order to fill this gap, we need to define the subject. Defining the subject is the a priori  
process of taking a term K and deriving the necessary and sufficient conditions for counting as a K 
by imagining the various possible situations in which something would count as a K. This process is 
guided by our intuitions concerning whether or not, if certain conditions obtained, these conditions 
would count as  K. Insofar as our  intuitions about  K coincide with the folk intuitions about  K, these 
2 It is important to note that while eliminativism about some areas of discourse might be a plausible position, Jackson 
believes that, with respect to the location problem, eliminativism is not an option. For example, “rivers”, “explosions”, 
“buildings” and a variety of other terms are not explicitly described in the language of natural science. In this way, if 
eliminativism  was  a  plausible  solution  to  the  location  problem,  then  we  would  be  committed  to  the  belief  that 
explosions, buildings, rivers, etc. do not exist and this is clearly false.
3 Where “minimal” suggests setting the T statement satisfying nature of the world and doing nothing more.‐
4 Where satisfying the T statements is making the ‐ T statements true.‐
5 Jackson, F. (1994) Armchair Metaphysics. In Michael, M. & O’Leary Hawthorne, J. (eds.) ‐ Philosophy in Mind: The 
Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind, pp. 23 34.‐
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necessary and sufficient  conditions  will  isolate  the folk theory of  K.  Furthermore,  because this 
process is a priori  it  is a species of conceptual analysis6.  Jackson maintains that,  once our folk 
theory of K has been a priori defined, we will know that K is associated with a rigidified definite 
description7 consisting of necessary and sufficient conditions for being a  K. If  K is not explicitly 
contained within of the vocabulary of the relevant “serious metaphysics”, then knowledge of  K’s 
description  will  explain,  provided  we have found some term in  the  vocabulary of  the relevant 
“serious metaphysics” that satisfies K’s description, how K is actually contained within the relevant 
vocabulary. In this way, because statements about K would be included in the D statements, Jackson‐  
can  use  conceptual  analysis  to  explain  how the  D statements  are  entailed  by the  ‐ T statements.‐  
Therefore, conceptual analysis is a necessary part of solving the location problem and, hence, a 
necessary part of doing “serious metaphysics”.
Two-Dimensional Semantics and the A Priori
The  claim  that  discovering  that  the  T statements  entail  the  ‐ D statements  occurs  by  ‐ a  priori  
conceptual  analysis  might  seem overly contentious.  For  example,  say that  “gold” is  not  in  the 
vocabulary of a “serious metaphysics” and, therefore, statements about gold will not be contained 
within the  D statements; while the symbol “Au” is in the vocabulary of the serious metaphysics‐  
and, therefore, statements about Au are contained within  T statements. If Jackson is correct, then‐  
our a priori knowledge of gold as the actual stuff that plays the gold-role should be sufficient to 
determine the referent of gold, namely Au. However, as Putnam and Kripke have shown, our a 
priori knowledge is not sufficient to show that gold is necessarily Au, rather our knowledge of this 
necessity  is  an  a  posteriori  matter.  Therefore,  it  might  be  objected  that  the  apparent  fact  of  a 
posteriori necessity is sufficient to show that a priori conceptual analysis is not a necessary part of 
explaining entry by entailment and, hence, solving the location problem.
In response to this claim, Jackson distinguishes between two different kinds of intensions, or 
functions from worlds to extensions. This distinction arises out of the different ways in which one 
can consider possible worlds. C-intensions are functions from worlds to extensions where the actual 
world w@ is taken as fixed and the intension is used to pick out extensions in counterfactual worlds 
w1…wn with respect to w@. The C intension, therefore, picks out the same extension in ‐ w1…wn as it 
does in w@. In this way, because gold is Au in w@, the C-intension of “gold” will pick out Au in all 
counterfactual worlds, regardless of the properties or descriptions associated with “gold” at those 
worlds. This is the intension that concerns the Kripke Putnam cases. A intensions, by contrast, are‐ ‐  
functions from worlds to extensions in which whatever world the A intension is being used to pick‐  
out an extension in is taken to be w@. Moreover, Jackson believes that the A intension of a natural‐  
kind term like “gold” corresponds to a rigidified definite description: The actual  X that plays the 
gold role. Therefore, the A intension of “gold” at a world ‐ ‐ w1 where XYZ, instead of Au, performs 
the gold-role will pick out XYZ instead of Au. Jackson uses this distinction to evade the above 
criticism by claiming that  all  the  criticism shows is  that  we do not  have  a  priori  access  to  C 
intensions. In spite of this, Jackson claims that we do have a priori access to A intensions. Hence,‐  
we have a priori access to the rigidified definite description of “gold” and, therefore, we know a 
priori that:
C) Gold is the actual stuff that plays the gold role.‐
Moreover, Jackson maintains that our a priori knowledge of A intensions allows for our a priori‐  
understanding  that  the  T statements  entail  the  ‐ D-statements.  For  example,  if  statements  about 
“gold”  are  members  of  the  D-statements  and  statements  about  “Au”  are  members  of  the  T‐
6 A paradigm instance of this would be the discourse on the Gettier cases concerning the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of knowledge.
7 A rigidified definite description would usually correspond to a conjunction of the stereotypical features of a referent, a 
sortal, a uniqueness clause and a operator that specifies the actual world.
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statements, then we can come to know that statements about “Au” entail statements about “gold” in 
the following way:
A) Au is a precious metal. (Premise)
B) Au is the actual stuff that plays the gold role. (Empirical fact)‐
C) Gold is the actual stuff that plays the gold role. (A priori)‐
D) Therefore, gold is a precious metal.
Notice that the above argument is valid a priori. This is because, once we have a priori access to the 
A intension in C) and know all the relevant facts about the terms ‐ within the T statements (premise‐  
B)), we can discover a priori that the T-statements entail the D statements. Thus, Jackson is able to‐  
vindicate a priori  conceptual analysis  and it’s  role in the entry by entailment thesis despite the 
Kripke Putnam cases. In this way, Jackson can claim that conceptual analysis is essential to the‐  
entry by entailment thesis, solving of the Location Problem and, therefore, is a necessary part of 
doing “serious metaphysics”. This claim, however, depends on the claim that speakers have a priori 
access to A-intensions8.
Objection from Epistemic Access to A-intension Stereotypes
Laurence and Margolis (LM) object to Jackson’s claim that conceptual analysis plays an essential 
role  in  “serious metaphysics”,  by suggesting that  our  epistemic access  to  A intensions  is  not  a‐  
priori, but rather a posteriori. LM claim that knowledge of
C) Gold is the actual stuff that plays the gold role,‐
Requires  knowing  the  stereotypical  elements  associated  with  gold.  The  gold-stereotype  would 
presumably include that gold is a shiny yellowish metal, traditionally involved in currency, etc. This‐  
is what knowledge of the “gold role” consists in.‐
LM suggest that we cannot have a priori access to a description which picks out the referent 
of  “gold”  in  each  world  w  considered  w@,  because  we  don’t  even  have  a  priori  access  to  a 
description that picks out the referent of “gold” in the actual w@. This is because all the elements of 
a natural kind stereotype are open to revision in light of empirical findings. This is because 1) the 
stereotype for a natural kind term might  be based on atypical or idiosyncratic samples and 2) the 
conditions of observation might affect the characteristics of the natural kind, therefore, allowing for 
these characteristics to change over time. For example, for all we know, the introduction of a new 
gas into the atmosphere at a future time tF might cause gold to have a dull red colour rather than a‐  
shiny-yellowish colour. Moreover, scientists and historians might discover that the “gold” that has 
traditionally been involved in various economic matters was actually a kind of fools gold rather 
than Au. If these cases obtained, then we would need to revise our gold stereotype. Jackson might‐  
suggest that,  because only a sufficient number of the elements associated with gold need to be 
satisfied, the fact that some of the elements of the gold stereotype are a posteriori revisable should‐  
not  pose  a  problem for  his  view.  However,  LM suggest  that,  all  of  the  elements  of  the  gold‐
stereotype are in principle revisable in this way, thus, blocking Jackson’s suggestion. Therefore, 
because revision of the gold stereotype in light of empirical findings is a species of a posteriori‐  
knowledge,  LM conclude that our knowledge of the gold stereotype and,  therefore,  C) is  not a‐  
priori but rather a posteriori. Therefore, because our knowledge of A intensions is an a posteriori‐  
matter, conceptual analysis, conceived as an a priori process, is not a necessary part of “serious 
metaphysics”9.
8 Jackson, F. (1998) From Ethics to Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 29 85.‐
9 Laurence,  M.  and  Margolis,  E.  (2003)  Concepts  and  Conceptual  Analysis.  Philosophy  and  Phenomenological  
35
Thought Experiment Response and Vindication of Conceptual Analysis
LM’s argument is, however, too strong. The argument is too strong because LM claim that all of the 
elements of the gold stereotype are in principle a posteriori revisable. In order to show that this‐  
claim is too strong, I will first present a thought experiment showing that 1) definite descriptions of 
some sort are necessary for a agent to know the referent of a term and 2) that these descriptions 
need not be anything substantial in terms of stereotypical properties, they merely need to delineate 
some kind of role that the natural kind plays. The first thought experiment is as follows:
TE1) Imagine two qualitatively identical steel spheres; the one on the left hand side you  ‐
have named “Jonny” and the one on the right hand side you have named “Amanda”. The ‐
spheres are then shuffled when you are not looking. Suppose that I ask you now which  
sphere is “Amanda” and which one is “Jonny”. Can you refer in this case?
It should be obvious that, in this case, you will not be able to tell me which is “Amanda” and which 
is “Jonny” even though there is a fact of the matter that goes with the distribution of properties: 
Amanda is the one on the left hand side that you named “Amanda” and “Jonny” is the one on the‐  
right hand side that you named “Jonny”. Moreover, the reason why you cannot know the referent in‐  
thismcase is precisely because you would have  no  description associated with either of the steel 
spheres10.  It  follows  that  1)  having  some  associated  definite  description  about  an  object  is  a 
necessary  condition  being  able  to  refer  to  that  object.  Furthermore,  TE1)  shows  that  2)  the 
description need not have anything to do with the stereotypical elements typically associated with 
the referent. All that is needed is that the description delineates some kind of role that the referent 
plays, in this case the role of being named either “Jonny” or “Amanda”. In this way, Jackson’s 
initial response to LM seems more plausible11: We only need  some  elements associated with the 
natural kind to be a part of the rigidified definite description.
We are now in a position to show that LM’s claim is too strong. Remember, because LM 
claim that, in principle, all of elements of a natural kind’s definite description can be revised in light 
of empirical findings, it should be the case that our description of gold could be completely revised 
and yet we would still  be talking about gold. Consider the following thought experiment about 
another natural kind term “water”:
TE2) Scientists have declared that, as we all know, water is H2O. But suppose that at some
future time tF scientists discover that, contrary to what we thought, H2O was not the stuff
that filled the lakes, came from the taps or had any of the properties typically associated with 
water. Scientists even discovered that H2O was not the object that caused us to say water
when we talked about it and was not the thing that played the water role in everyday life.‐
H2O is actually always a black gas, it never caused us to say anything until recently, plays no 
role in nourishment, etc. 
Would we say that, provided the above obtained, in talking about H2O, we are still talking about 
water? TE2) should make it clear that once all the elements of a referent’s definite description have 
been revised in light of empirical findings, we would not say that we would still be talking about the 
relevant natural kind. Rather if TE2) obtained we would be compelled to say that we have changed 
the subject. In this way, LM cannot claim that all of the elements of a referent’s rigidified definite 
Research, 67, No. 2, 260 263.‐
10 Jackson, F. (2009) Replies to My Critics. In Ravenscroft, I. (ed.) Mind, Ethics and Conditionals: Themes from the  
Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 411 12.‐
11 Of course, this alone does not prove that Jackson’s response is correct, for it could still be the case that parts of the 
definite description are all a posteriori revisable.
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description can be revised in light of empirical findings. Furthermore, as TE1) has shown, we must 
have access to some kind of definite description that delineates some role that the natural kind plays 
that is a priori, and not a posteriori revisable in order to refer to the natural kind at all12. In this way, 
because LM’s universal claim is false, LM’s argument does not go through. Therefore, not only can 
Jackson claim that only a sufficient number of the elements associated with gold need to be satisfied 
in order to refer, but also that we can still have a priori access to C) and, therefore, to A intensions‐  
in general.
Objection from Epistemic Access to the Theories that Determine A-intensions
While LM might not have convincingly shown that we do not have a priori access to A intensions‐  
because the elements of a natural kind’s rigidified definite description are a posteriori revisable, 
Laura Schroeter (LS) has presented an argument suggesting that we do not have a priori access to 
A intensions because the  ‐ theories  which determine the rigidified definite description of a natural 
kind term are a posteriori revisable. Therefore, if LS is correct, then we cannot have a priori access 
to A intensions and, therefore, conceptual analysis cannot plausibly be held to play an essential role‐  
in “serious metaphysics”.
LS begins her argument with an analysis of the component parts of an A-intension13 for a 
natural kind. She distinguishes between two distinct parts of a rigidified definite description: 1) a 
sortal and 2) an actual world description. The sortal specifies what sort of object or property would‐  
qualify as a candidate for reference, while the actual world description specifies the properties that‐  
must be satisfied in order for an object to fall into the extension of a concept in the actual extension 
of the concept. The actual world description was the focus of LM’s criticism. LS focuses on how‐  
one would come to know the sortal part of the rigidified definite description and, therefore, does not 
inherit the problems of LM’s criticism. Furthermore, LS suggests that the sortal is a necessary part 
of  an  A-intension’s  rigidified  definite  description,  for,  if  Jackson  is  to  underwrite  a  priori 
conclusions about gold, then the analysis available to the subject on the basis of a priori reflection 
must make a substantive claim about the kind of object that gold is. This can only be done with a 
sortal.
Once this  has been established,  LS considers  the kinds  of intuitions  that  might  a  priori 
determine  the  nature  of  the  sortal.  Jackson  further  distinguishes  first order  from second order‐ ‐  
intuitions14. Our first order intuitions are those intuitions which Jackson claims define the subject.‐  
By contrast, our second order intuitions are our intuitions about how we should revise our first‐ ‐
order intuitions. These are, affectively, our best intuitions about how to theorize about natural kind 
terms. LS suggests  that,  in order to account for a  sortal  that  is  a)  narrow enough to specify a 
determinate class of referents and b) broad enough to accommodate all the ways we think we might 
be mistaken about the nature of what we are referring to, our sortal must be determined by our 
second order intuitions.‐
We are now in a position to articulate LS’s claim that we do not have a priori access to A‐
intensions.  LS  claims  that,  because  Jackson  claims  that  we  can  know  the  rigidified  definite 
descriptions for natural kind terms a priori, Jackson is committed to the claim that our best second‐
order  intuitions  are  infallible,  i.e.  that  they  cannot  be  revised  in  light  of  empirical  evidence. 
However, our second-order intuitions amount to our best theories about how to determine what gold
is. In this way, because second order intuitions determine what ‐ counts as a the kind of thing gold is, 
if we change our theory about how to determine what gold is, then Jackson is committed to that 
12 It may be the case that certain elements of the natural kind are more essential than others to the rigidified definite 
description. My arguments do not take a stance on which elements these might be, for all I intend to do is show that 
LM’s argument is false and that Jackson can keep his original claim: that we need a priori knowledge of an A intension‐  
in order to refer.
13 LS calls this a natural kind’s reference fixing conditions.‐
14LS calls these first and second order dispositions.‐
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claim that we are changing the subject. LS, however, points out how implausible this claim is by 
considering the way Aristotle theorized about water. Aristotle had a radically different theory about 
the kind of thing that water is than we do today, and, therefore, Jackson would be committed to the 
claim that when Aristotle spoke of “water” he was not referring to what we refer to when we talk 
about  “water”  today.  This,  however,  seems absurd.  The  more  realistic  story to  tell  is  that  our 
theories  can,  and  should  be,  revised  in  light  of  empirical  evidence  and  that,  because  theory 
determination is an a posteriori  matter, we need not suggest that  our second order intuitions be‐  
infallible. Hence, we can still claim that, despite the difference in second order intuitions, Aristotle‐  
referred to the same object that we do in our talk of water. In this way, because the theories that 
determine the sortal of the A intensions associated with natural kind terms are a posteriori revisable,‐  
it follows that we cannot know the A intensions of natural kind terms a priori‐ 15.
Theory-nesting A-intension Response and Further Vindication of Conceptual 
Analysis
LS’s objection, however, rests on the assumption that the sortal of the rigidified definite description 
of the A intension of a natural kind is determined by our best theories. It is for this reason that‐  
Jackson’s claim to our a priori access to A intensions does not accurately account for our ability to‐  
refer in the face of changes in scientific theory. In this final section, I will show that by adopting a 
certain  kind of  rigidified  definite  description,  one that  nests  theories  and is  not  determined by 
theories, then Jackson can evade LS’s argument and claim that A-intension can be known a priori.
David  Braddon Mitchell‐ 16 has  developed  the  kind  of  rigidified  definite  description  that 
Jackson needs in order to save his claim. Consider our folk theory of a natural kind term, in the 
sense specified above, to be a level 1 theory ‐ T1 that says that gold is whatever plays the actual gold‐
role by some possibly unknown true theory TT. Furthermore, let P1, P2 and Pt be terms in theories 
T1, T2 and TT respectively. We are now in a position to state the theory nesting rigidified definite‐  
description of gold:
TN) Gold is whatever plays the gold role according to ‐ T1 (Folk theory) that contains a term 
P1  (gold)  and  a  clause  that  associates  with  P1  whatever  second order  intuitions  are  ‐
associated with the term Pt of some true theory TT that explains the nature of what plays the 
gold role actually‐ 17.
If Jackson adopts the rigidified definite description in TN) as the A intension of gold, then he can‐  
evade LS’s objection. For example, call Aristotle’s theory about gold T2. Aristotle would consider 
T2 = TT, for he would consider T2 the true theory. Years later, empirical evidence suggests that T2 
is false and that our current theory T3 = TT. In this case, the a posteriori change in theory does not 
entail that in moving from T2 to T3 one changes the subject, for, in each case, the rigidified definite 
description refers to whatever actually plays the gold role. Rather, only our second order intuitions‐ ‐  
change from T2  to  T3. In this way, TN) can be said to nest theories. Therefore, contrary to LS’s 
assumption, the A intensions of natural kinds are not necessarily determined by our theories. Thus,‐  
a posteriori changes in theory do not present a challenge to our a priori access to A intensions,‐  
provided Jackson adopts TN).
Conclusion
Therefore, because Jackson can avoid the skeptical arguments against our a priori knowledge of A‐
intensions presented by both LM and LS, Jackson can still claim that a priori conceptual analysis is 
15 Schroeter, L. (2004) The Limits of Conceptual Analysis. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85, 427 448.‐
16 Braddon Mitchell, D. (2005) The Subsumption of Reference. ‐ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56, 157 60.‐
17 The rigidified definite description has been altered a bit to respond directly to LS’s objection.
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an essential part of doing “serious metaphysics”. This claim, however, can only be made provided 
he puts certain constraints on the kind of rigidified definite description used as an A intension. In‐  
this way, Jackson’s vindication of conceptual analysis is, perhaps, much more difficult to debunk 
than the skeptics have assumed.
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